Abstract-Emerging-markets firms often carry foreign-currency debt on their balance sheets. Following a depreciation, the expanding "peso" value of "dollar" liabilities could, via a net-worth effect, offset the expansionary competitiveness effect. To assess which effect dominates, we use accounting data (including the currency composition of liabilities) for 450ϩ nonfinancial firms in five Latin American countries in the 1990s. We find that firms holding more dollar debt do not invest less than their pesoindebted counterparts following a depreciation. We also show that these firms match the currency denomination of their liabilities with the exchange rate sensitivity of their profits.
I. Introduction
T HE emerging-market financial crises of the late 1990s have challenged the old view of financial crises as having purely macroeconomic causes. None of the countries was turning to the printing press to cover budget deficits, nor were there large output gaps signaling a future need to devalue, as in the first and second generation of crisis models. As a result, a new view has emerged in which the emphasis has shifted away from government-level and macro variables to firm-level financial variables and to the interaction of these variables with aggregate shocks. 1 Numerous authors (such as, Krugman, 1999a; Aghion, Bacchetta, & Banerjee, 2001; and Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco, 2004) point to debt denominated in foreign currency as a central protagonist behind these crises. The key mechanism is that a depreciation inflates the peso value of dollar debt and the resulting weakening of balance sheet positions prevents firms from investing and expanding. 2 Despite the prominent role attributed to foreign-currency debt in recent financial crises, there is scarce empirical evidence documenting the detrimental effects of currency exposure on firm-level investment during these crises. 3 The present study addresses this question directly. We construct a new database with accounting information (including the currency composition of liabilities) for approximately 500 publicly traded nonfinancial firms in five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. These data cover most of the large economies of Latin America for the period 1990 to 1999, a period of substantial exchange rate volatility for many of these countries. 4 In addition, there are firms in our sample that hold substantial amounts of foreign-currency debt. These elements constitute the two ingredients necessary for testing the proposed mechanism. Our choice of publicly listed firms is determined exclusively by the availability of data on the currency composition of debt. We concentrate on the nonfinancial sector of the economy, as it is here that investment decisions are ultimately carried out. We examine two types of firm investment: fixed capital and inventories.
Our empirical strategy is to assess whether firms with more dollar debt invest less in the aftermath of a depreciation. We do so by estimating reduced-form equations for inventory and fixed-capital investment. The proposed mechanism centers on the interaction of dollar indebtedness with shifts in the exchange rate, and so the key variable in our analysis is ͑dollar debt͒ i,tϪ1 ϫ ͑⌬ln exchange rate͒ t .
This interaction effect can be thought of as having two components: a balance sheet channel and a competitiveness channel. The latter refers to the potential income gains from a depreciation for exporting firms, or firms operating in tradable sectors, and depends on how dollar debt is distributed across firms. More precisely, the key determinant of the 3 Both Mitton (2002) and Lemmon and Lins (2003) find that firms in East Asia that were more leveraged (without regard to currency) saw steeper declines in their stock values following the large exchange rate depreciations of the 1990s. Moreover, Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2001) show that market capitalizations dropped more for East Asian firms holding larger shares of unhedged foreign-currency debt. On the other hand, Conesa-Labastida (1997) and Martinez and Werner (2002) examine determinants of the currency composition of debt in Mexican corporations, but do not consider its interaction with exchange rate movements or the impact on corporate investment. Several recent studies do consider investment behavior, and we compare our results with theirs in section VC. 4 Foreign-currency-denominated debt may have played an important role in the Argentinean crisis of 2001. Nevertheless, we believe that this episode is not the best place to look for balance sheet effects, as these correspond to changes in net worth that arise due to the valuation effects built in to the debt contract, whereas in Argentina most debt contracts were rewritten at the time of the crisis through pesification. See Calomiris (2007). sign of the overall effect is how strongly related the currency composition of debt is with the exchange rate sensitivity of profits at the firm level. If, on average, this relation is strongly positive, then we say that firms are "currency matching" their balance sheet with their income stream. If this is the case, then the sign of the interaction will be ambiguous as those firms holding higher shares of dollarized debt are also those firms that see the largest increases in current and future profits following a depreciation. The sum total of these two effects is the parameter we seek to measure, because it is informative about whether balance sheet effects dominate competitiveness factors. This unconditional, or net, approach distinguishes our study from Aguiar (2005) , for example, who measures the interaction effect conditional on competitiveness factors.
Our main result is that we fail to find a significant, negative coefficient on this interaction: dollar-indebted firms do not invest less than their peso counterparts following a depreciation. Indeed, for many plausible specifications, we estimate a positive and statistically significant coefficient. We argue that this result is due to the degree to which firms match the currency composition of their debt with the elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. In the wake of a depreciation, the reduction of investment and output induced by the increase in indebtedness is more than offset by higher current and future income. We further show that it is the real hedge provided by the elasticity of net sales to the exchange rate and not the financial hedge from nonoperational income (which includes income from currency derivatives) that explains our results.
Accordingly, we find that, after a depreciation, earnings are higher in those firms holding more dollar debt. Moreover, in our sample, dollarization of liabilities is higher in firms whose income we expect ex ante to be more positively correlated with the real exchange rate (firms with tradable products, for example). Furthermore, our estimates of the above interaction term drop when we control for factors that proxy for the firms' changing profit opportunities. Therefore, the empirical finding essentially results from omitted variables-unobserved firm-level characteristics associated with a higher elasticity of income to the exchange rate. We argue that this matching is the natural consequence of the risk aversion that firms will exhibit in the face of capital market imperfections. By systematically matching the exchange rate sensitivities of their income statement and balance sheet, firms are in effect hedging some of the exchange rate risk to which they are exposed.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section II contains a description of our sample and variables. In section III, we discuss the impact of dollar indebtedness on investment behavior, and present our empirical strategy. In section IV, we present the main results of the study: relative to corporations indebted in pesos, firms holding dollar debt did not invest less following depreciations of the domestic currency. We also show that this finding is not sensitive to including a variety of firm-level controls, using alternative estimators, or examining specific countries or episodes. We then turn our attention to each of the two channels affecting firm-level investment: competitiveness (section V.A) and net worth (section V.B). Section V.C contains a discussion of our results in light of complementary studies that have come to the fore in the past several years. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. Description of Data
This section describes our sample and variables. Our data consist of firm-level accounting information for nonfinancial corporations in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico for the period 1990 to 1999. In addition, we have data describing the firms' main products, sectors in which they operate, ownership, and a history of the main corporate events. Our main source of information is the Bloomberg database on publicly traded firms. Additionally, some data for Brazilian firms and all data for Argentinean firms come from a second data set: Economatica. Our choice of sources hinges on the availability of balance sheet data that include a decomposition of liabilities by currency of denomination.
For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the nonfinancial firms for which foreign-currency liability data are available. Table 1 shows the number of observations in the final sample per country and year as well as descriptive statistics for the main variables we use. The size of the sample changes as new firms are listed and incorporated into the Bloomberg database. 5 The decline in the number of observations toward the end of the sample is due to changes in the reporting requirements for foreign-currency debt, and not a result of bankruptcies.
Our main dependent variables are two measures of investment. The first is investment in fixed capital, measured as net purchases of fixed assets. We opt not to use the change in net fixed assets as a measure of investment because accounting standards in most of the countries in our sample allow for revaluations of assets, making it impossible to separate investment from changes in the accounting valuation of capital goods. The second is investment in inventories defined as the change in the stock of inventories in a given period. Inventories include raw materials, works in progress, and finished goods. In addition to investment, we also look at the effects of dollar debt on two income variables: net sales and income from operating activities.
The central explanatory variable is foreign-currency debt (D*), which is reported in the original data as the book value of foreign-currency liabilities converted into the respective local currency. In all of the countries in our sample, accounting standards dictate that conversion of debt from foreign to local-currency values be carried out using the exchange rate for the period in which the balance sheet is reported. 6 (Further details on the data construction and variable definitions are provided in the data appendix.)
Because we are interested in the effects of a devaluation on firms holding dollar debt, we interact D* with changes in real exchange rate, ⌬e. We choose to treat the accounting data in units of real pesos, and our definition of e (nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar scaled by the local CPI) is consistent with this inflation adjustment. It is straightforward to show that using e on inflation-adjusted values of debt is equivalent to using the nominal exchange rate on current values. Note that according to this definition, a devaluation leads to a higher value of e. Also note that because we do not have information on the exact currency composition of foreign debt, our assumption throughout is that all foreigncurrency debt is denominated in U.S. dollars. We believe this to be a reasonable approximation, as the volatility of the currencies in our sample usually dominates any exchange rate movements among creditor currencies.
III. Framework

A. Dollar Debt and Balance Sheet Effects
At about the same time as Robert Mundell was receiving the Nobel Prize for economics, a series of studies-inspired by the emerging-market crises of the late 1990s-seemed to be undercutting the central assumption of the MundellFleming model: that a depreciation of the exchange rate has an expansionary effect for the macro-economy. This new view of depreciations is centered on the micro level and pays particular attention to the (changing) credit constraints facing firms during financial crises. The key assumption of this literature is that the cost of external funds is decreasing in firm net worth. 7 The second ingredient in these models is that some fraction of debt be denominated in foreign currency. A depreciation, therefore, not only has the usual effects on aggregate demand but also deteriorates net worth by inflating the domestic-currency value of debt. Holding all else fixed, we expect that the higher indebtedness leads to an increase in the cost of external finance and to a reduction in investment. Krugman (1999a) presents a stylized version of this effect, while Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) , and Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) incorporate this mechanism into more fully articulated models.
Explanations of why firms choose to hold dollar debt in the first place typically include a failure of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). Several explanations have been put forward for a lower ex ante dollar rate. One set of 7 The link described above between investment and net worth has been widely treated in a variety of venues, including macroeconomics and corporate finance. On the macro side of things, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop closed-economy "financial accelerator" models in which the premium on external credit is decreasing in net worth. Additionally, an extensive empirical literature documents the effect of net worth on investment. Hubbard (1998) carries out an exhaustive survey of the literature on capital market imperfections and investment. Panel A displays, per country and year, the number of firms in the sample that have nonmissing data on lagged foreign-currency debt. In panel B, firm-level variables are contemporaneous unless otherwise indicated. All accounting variables are converted to real (constant-peso) values and scaled by the lagged real value of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables are from the current period (i.e., concurrent with the investment variables). The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate divided by the domestic CPI. The accounting data are the pooled Bloomberg/Economatica sample, as described in the text. Macrodata are drawn from various sources, principally International Financial Statistics. For detailed sources and descriptions, see section II and the data appendix. models posits that dollarized debt entitles the creditor to larger payments in periods of default, lowering the required interest rate on dollar loans. 8 In another set of models (Jeanne 1999a (Jeanne , 1999b , foreign-currency debt lowers interest rates by reducing moral hazard and signaling problems. In Calvo (1999 Calvo ( , 2001 , the failure of uncovered interest parity can be attributed to the interaction of information asymmetries and regulatory restrictions on the banking sector and to the costs of forming devaluation expectations, which are then included in the price of peso debt. 9 Finally, a series of authors argue that dollar debt is often the safest form of financing (or saving) in emerging markets. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) stress that in the absence of a long-term local-currency market, firms are willing to take on exchange rate risk to avoid the interest rate risk inherent in short-term peso liabilities. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998) argue that a history of bad monetary policy in emerging markets causes investors to place a premium on peso debt, regardless of contemporary policy. In these economies investors favor dollardenominated debt contracts because they provide partial insurance against unexpected inflation.
Following a movement in the exchange rate, three main mechanisms will affect the investment decision of a firm holding dollar debt: (i) the peso value of dollar debt will change, altering the value of total debt; (ii) internal funds available for investment will be affected because of changes in current profits; and (iii) shifts in relative prices will change the marginal product of capital. The first two mechanisms will immediately affect the firm's net worth, and, in the presence of financial frictions, will affect investment by altering the cost of capital. The third mechanism will affect demand for capital by altering current and future marginal returns on investment. The net result of these three effects on investment is ambiguous and will depend on the size of inherited dollar debt, the sensitivity of the risk premium on external funds to changes in firm leverage, and the impact of the real exchange rate on current and future profits. 10 To simplify the discussion, we will refer to the effect of the exchange rate on dollar debt (the first mechanism mentioned above) as the balance sheet effect. 11 The next two mechanisms mentioned above are both part of what we will call the competitiveness effect; that is, the effect of the exchange rate on current and future profits.
We measure the sum of these two effects below, in order to better assess whether the competitiveness benefits of the depreciation were strong enough to offset balance sheet effects. If dollar debt is distributed randomly across the economy, then we would expect firms with higher levels of inherited dollar debt to have a lower (and possibly negative) elasticity of investment to movements in the exchange rate. If, on the other hand, firms match income streams with the currency composition of liabilities, then those firms that we observe holding higher levels of dollarized liabilities will also be those firms whose profits respond most favorably to a depreciation. This being the case, it is uncertain whether firms holding dollar debt will invest relatively less than their counterparts following a depreciation, as the negative impact of increasing indebtedness will be offset by rising current and future profits.
B. Law of Motion for Debt
The key explanatory variable in our analysis is the interaction of lagged dollar debt, D* i,tϪ1 , with the log change in the real exchange rate, ⌬e t . A simple way to motivate this interaction term is to write down the law of motion for total debt, expressed in terms of inflation-adjusted pesos. We start by considering the movement of nominal balance sheet variables over time. Dollar debt, D* t , follows a simple law of motion:
where DS* t is the period-t debt service paid on dollar debt and DN* t is the net issuance of new debt in period t. We multiply by S t
CPI T CPI t
, where S t is the nominal exchange rate, to obtain an equation in period-T pesos. We denote X t as the period-t value of variable X expressed in period-T pesos. If we assume that debt service exactly covers accrued interest charges each period, so that DS* t ϭ D* tϪ1 r* tϪ1 , then the law of motion for dollar debt becomes
Similarly, for peso-denominated debt we have
where t is a factor that allows for the indexation of domestic-currency debt. As before, we transform the equation into period-T units, and maintain the assumption that interest is paid completely each period. We then parameterize the indexation of debt as follows: t ϭ (
. This allows for the special cases of full indexation (␣ ϭ 1), no indexation (␣ ϭ 0), and for intermediate values.
8 For Schneider and Tornell (2004) , this takes place within the banking sector, where bailouts to dollar-indebted banks accompany devaluations. Chamon (2001) , on the other hand, argues that when defaults are correlated with depreciations, holders of dollar debt benefit from the fact that they are entitled to a larger share of the liquidated assets.
9 Regulatory constraints on currency mismatch encourage foreign banks to lend in their own currency, and, as a result, they charge a premium on peso rates. Similar regulatory constraints force domestic banks to match dollar deposits with dollar loans. Because of information advantages, these banks have incentives to place this debt domestically, leading to a lower equilibrium rate on dollar loans.
10 For a formal articulation of this investment problem at the firm level, see Bleakley and Cowan (2002) .
11 Strictly speaking the firm's balance sheet will be affected by both the changing value of liabilities and the effect of current earnings on assets. We choose to ignore this second mechanism simply for expositional reasons, as most of the literature emphasizes the interaction between liabilities and the exchange rate. We return to this issue in section VC.
Defining total debt P t as P t ϭ D t ϩ D t * and the real exchange rate E t as E t (S t /CPI t ) we find that
where all lowercase variables correspond to logs. The first term on the right-hand side is the one of interest. The real value of the firm's debt rises if it holds foreign-currency debt and the exchange rate goes up faster than the domesticprice level. This is, of course, a purely mechanical effect. The second term indicates that domestic-currency debt can be "inflated away," albeit at a slower pace if the debt is indexed to the local-price level. Finally, net issues of new debt also change the firm's level of debt holdings. This latter factor is endogenous, so we focus only on the autonomous component in our empirical work.
C. Empirical Methodology
As argued above, the key explanatory variable in our analysis is the interaction of lagged dollar debt, D* i,tϪ1 , with the change in the real exchange rate, ⌬e t . This interaction corresponds to the differential effect of a depreciation on firms with varying levels of dollarized debt. We also argued above that predictions for the sign of this effect are ambiguous, and will depend on the extent to which firms match the currency composition of their income with that of their liabilities. The estimated sign of this coefficient should indicate whether the large (negative) balance sheet effects of a depreciation on firms holding high levels of dollarized debt are offset by a larger (positive) competitiveness effect in these firms.
In addition to interaction effects, we also include lagged foreign-currency-denominated debt and country ϫ year fixed effects. Including the main effect of dollar debt absorbs any preexisting differences among firms with different levels of dollar indebtedness. Such differences might have prevailed in the absence of movements in the real exchange rate, for example, if expanding firms were more likely to issue dollar debt than stagnant ones. The aggregate main effect, a fixed effect for country ϫ year, captures the macroeconomic changes that may impact all firms in the economy without regard to the currency composition of their balance sheet.
The basic specification (for firm i in country j at year t) that results is
where Y ijt is the firm-level outcome, typically investment. This empirical framework allows us to estimate the result of holding dollar debt during an exchange rate realignment. It bears mentioning that this is not measuring a causal effect, but instead the result of a combination of one causal factor-the effect from increases in the peso value of debtand other changes in financial and capital-demand factors that happen to be correlated with the currency composition of the firm's debt. To equation (5), we also add additional firm and macroeconomic control variables. 12 These are detailed below. We estimate this equation using ordinary least squares (OLS) on the accounting data described above. Note that investment is therefore modeled as a function of predetermined micro-level variables plus the contemporaneous (macro) change in the real exchange rate, which is exogenous to any particular firm.
IV. Investment
A. Main Results
Firms in our sample that hold dollar debt do not invest less than peso-indebted firms after a depreciation. To show this, we employ the empirical methodology detailed above, and pay particular attention to the estimated coefficient on the interaction of lagged dollar debt and the change in the exchange rate, (D* ϫ ⌬e). Systematically, we fail to find a significant negative coefficient: dollar-indebted firms do not invest relatively less following a depreciation. Indeed, we often find exactly the opposite: firms with dollar debt invest significantly more following a depreciation than pesoindebted firms.
We focus on two types of investment: investment in fixed capital and investment in inventories. These are both important components of business cycle fluctuations but reflect very different types of investment activity and are likely to respond differently to crisis-induced shifts in credit and demand conditions. Investment in inventories is a relatively short-term affair. The ratio of inventory to sales in our sample is such that a product in the pipeline will typically be gone in under two months. Investing in the accumulation of inventories is likely to be sensitive to the availability of working capital, short-term financing that is often secured internally or through trade credit offered by input suppliers. On the other hand, investment in fixed capital plays out over a much longer horizon, and has to do with the long-term expansion of the productive capacity of the firm. Table 2 presents estimates of the reduced-form relationship between investment and holding dollar debt during a depreciation. Columns 1-3 contain the results for fixedcapital investment, whereas in columns 4-6 we present estimates for inventory investment. We report the effect on current-year investment in panel A, whereas panel B contains results where investment for the following year is the 12 The baseline specification estimated below also contains total debt and the peso-debt indexation control. Based on the law of motion of debt (equation [4]) we add (1 Ϫ ␣ j )D i,tϪ1 ⌬cpi j,t to the specification, in which D i,tϪ1 is lagged peso debt (as before) and cpi j,t is the log of the local-price level. Using country-specific ␣ j allows the specification to accommodate different countries' use of indexed debt. In the working-paper versions of this study (Bleakley & Cowan, 2002 , 2005 , we present specifications without these controls and obtain results of similar magnitude. dependent variable. (Note that all the micro-level independent variables are lagged one year, so "current year" means contemporaneous with the macro variable. For panel B, the dependent variable is from period t ϩ 1 and the lagged dependent variable is therefore from period t.)
The regressions summarized in columns 1 and 4 include only the principal first-order effects and the interaction term: dollar debt times the change in the exchange rate. We do not obtain a negative coefficient estimate for the (D* ϫ ⌬e) coefficient in any of the four regressions. In fact, in three of the specifications we obtain positive point estimates that are significantly different from 0 at conventional confidence levels. Following periods of real depreciation, investment by dollar-indebted firms is not significantly lower than the investment of their peso-indebted counterparts.
This result is robust to the inclusion of several additional controls. In columns 2 and 5, we add the interaction of total debt with the change in the exchange rate to control for the differences in investment behavior of more highly leveraged firms in periods following a currency depreciation. The addition of this variable does not lead to substantial changes in the estimated (D* ϫ ⌬e) coefficient, although in some specifications the estimated coefficient turns statistically insignificant. Finally, recognizing that firms may face substantial adjustment costs when changing their levels of fixed capital, columns 3 and 6 include the lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. As expected, including the lagged dependent variable does lead to some changes in the estimated coefficients on the dollar-debt/exchange rate interaction. In all cases, however, we fail to obtain a negative and significant coefficient estimate for (D* ϫ ⌬e). Moreover, we can reject throughout that the four coefficients sum to 0 at conventional confidence intervals. 13 
B. Sensitivity Analysis
Dollar-indebted firms might differ from their pesoindebted counterparts along other dimensions than the currency composition of debt, so our first concern is that our results are driven by omitted variables. 14 For example, the firms that are able to issue debt in dollars may have better access to international or domestic capital markets or have a different maturity structure of debt, and as such can better cope with the credit crunches that tend to figure in the emerging-market crises. To address this, we start with the specifications presented in columns 3 and 6 of table 2 and 13 We perform these joint tests in two distinct ways: (i) by estimating a four-equation SUR model, and (ii) by simply summing the four investment components and running a new regression with this new variable on the left-hand side.
14 By this we are referring to omitted variables besides the exchange rate sensitivity of profits, which we consider in section V.A. Each column reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are indicator variables for each country-year cell, and country-specific interactions of peso debt with the log change in the CPI to allow for partial indexation of peso debt. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables (real exchange rate and CPI) are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI. The accounting data are from the pooled Bloomberg/Economatica database, as described in the text. Macrodata are drawn from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For detailed sources and descriptions, see section II and the data appendix.
add plausible proxies for the supposed omitted variables. The baseline results are shown in panel A of table 3, while panel B reports the coefficient on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction for various augmented specifications. In no case does the inclusion of these proxies result in a significant negative estimate of the relationship between investment and (D* ϫ ⌬e).
Although crises are often characterized by "flight to quality," we argue that the observed investment response to (D* ϫ ⌬e) is not due to dollar-indebted firms being higher quality and, therefore, better able to adapt to the changing exchange rate. In the first row of panel B, we allow for the possibility of a differential effect of depreciations between firms of different size. 15 In the second row of panel B, we condition on lagged firm performance by including a lag of earnings and its interaction with the change in the exchange rate. The inclusion of these variables results in negligible changes (less than one standard error) in our estimate of the effect of (D* ϫ ⌬e).
A related concern is that dollar-indebted firms might have more robust cross-border affiliations that allow them to weather these crisis episodes. To address this issue we construct two variables that proxy for foreign ownership. 16 The first of these variables indicates whether the firm has a parent company. 17 The second measure of foreign ownership is a dummy variable that indicates whether, in the previous period, the firm's shares were listed in a foreign stock exchange in the form of American depositary receipts (ADRs), as reported by the Bank of New York (2002). In addition to being a proxy for foreign ownership, a foreign listing may also have effects on information disclosure and liquidity of firm equity that may bias our results. Additionally, we code whether the firm's accountant was one of the American "Big Six" firms, which might improve a corporation's access to international capital markets. The results of estimating our baseline equation with the ownership controls (both as main effects and interacted with the change in the real exchange rate) are reported in the third row, panel B, of table 3. Once again, the effect of the additional control variables on our estimated coefficient on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction is minimal. 15 We classify firms by size according to the logarithm of total assets. We obtain similar results (not reported) when firms are classified according to log current assets or log fixed assets. 16 A series of recent papers have emphasized the effects of ownership and information variables on the relative performance of firms in crisis periods. Mitton (2002) finds that firm-level variables related to ownership and information disclosure had a strong impact on the relative performance (stock returns) of listed firms during the Asian crisis. Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2007) find that subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals outperform their locally owned couterparts in periods following large depreciations. 17 The initial coding is drawn directly from the Bloomberg database using their coding scheme. In all cases, we review the online archives of company news to verify that these ownership relationships predate the firm's first appearance in our sample. This ensures that these indicators are predetermined variables rather than endogenous outcomes. Each cell presents the estimates on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) variable from a different specification. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Independent variables in each regression are as in table 2, column 3, except as noted. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. The number of observations varies because of data availability. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets, except for the control for firm size, which is simply the logarithm of lagged assets. Additional controls in panel B enter the specification as a main effect and an interaction with the log change in the real exchange rate. The macroeconomic variables are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI. The accounting data are from the Bloomberg/Economatica database, as described in the text. Macrodata are drawn from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For detailed sources and descriptions, see section II and the data appendix.
Further investigating this credit-related hypothesis, we consider interactions of dollar debt with aggregate credit conditions in earlier versions of this study (Bleakley & Cowan, 2002 , 2005 . If dollar-indebted firms have differential access to international capital, and changes in the relative supply of domestic and foreign credit occur simultaneously with changes in the exchange rate, then our results may come from having omitted credit-market conditions in our estimates of investment. To control for changing credit conditions, we estimate the investment regressions including an indicator of domestic credit (the change in the aggregate stock of private credit issued by domestic banks) and a measure of foreign credit inflows. In each case, we interact the macroeconomic variable with total leverage and the foreign-currency debt to allow for the differential effects of local and international credit supply on firms. 18 The (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction remains either positive or insignificant even after including these additional controls.
The impact of changing credit conditions might also depend on the maturity structure of firm debt (see Bleakley & Cowan, 2004 , for example). To control for possible differences in the maturity structure of debt between dollarand peso-indebted firms, we directly include measures of short-term debt in our investment regressions. Furthermore, paralleling the treatment of dollar debt, we interact shortterm debt with the change in the exchange rate. 19 The results of including these interactions are displayed in the fourth row, panel B, of table 3. For both types of investment, we continue to obtain estimates of the coefficient on the interaction of dollar debt and the change in the exchange rate that are not significantly negative.
We obtain similar estimates for the coefficients on (D* ϫ ⌬e) using numerous alternative estimators. These new results are reported in panel C of table 3 and figure 1. Although in some cases the choice of estimator does affect 18 Note that we do not promote these variables as the definitive measure of shifting access to credit. Instead, we argue that they serve to determine whether the above estimates are contaminated by omitted variable bias. If D* is correlated with credit access, then including its interaction with aggregate credit variables absorbs the relevant part of the omitted variable. If D* is not correlated with the omitted access variable, then there is no omitted variable bias to be concerned with. Consequently, this test is informative in either case. 19 Similar results are found if we allow short-term debt to interact with aggregate measures of capital flows. See Bleakley and Cowan (2002, 2005) for these results. our point estimates, in no case do we find a significant negative effect of dollar debt on investment following a depreciation. We begin with alternative computations for the standard errors using the OLS estimator. In the first row of panel C, we correct the errors for the presence of correlated disturbances across firms within each country ϫ year cell, while the second row allows for fairly generic correlational structures within firms. The standard errors we compute in these cases are quite similar to the Huber-White ("robust") standard errors that are the default throughout the present study.
Our main results are not sensitive to relaxing the assumption that we can recover unbiased estimates of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 20 We carry out a simple exercise to address this concern. The basic idea is to reestimate the model for a variety of assumptions about the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (), and then to search for any reasonable choice of the suspect parameter that delivers a significantly negative estimate for the coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e). 21 We report the estimated coefficients on (D* ϫ ⌬e) obtained in this way in figure 1. Over the stable range of values of (that is, ʦ [Ϫ1, 1]), we obtain positive coefficient estimates in regressions for t and t ϩ 1 fixed capital and for t ϩ 1 inventory. For period-t inventory investment, the estimated coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e) is negative for Ͼ 0.25, but these estimates are never significantly different from 0. Moreover, in the working-paper version of this study, we also showed that instrumenting for lagged investment using twice-lagged values gave essentially similar results to those reported above. We have also experimented with IV estimators such as Arellano-Bond, and obtain similar results to the baseline. Note that our interest is not in the lagged-dependent-variable coefficient per se but in its effect on the estimate of (D* ϫ ⌬e).
Controlling for firm-level fixed effects does not generate estimates that favor the currency-mismatch hypothesis either. In the fourth row of panel C, we add firm-specific effects to the specifications. Although smaller coefficient estimates are obtained for all dependent variables except t ϩ 1 inventory investment, none of these coefficients is negative. 22 The specifications omit lagged dependent variables (see the previous row for comparable statistics from OLS) to obtain consistent estimates of the fixed effects. We also allow for firm fixed effects and an autoregressive error of order one (AR(1)) at the firm level in the estimation of the fixed-effects model; the results are found in the fifth row of panel C. Moreover, we can repeat the exercise in figure 1 using fixed-effects estimators and obtain similar results.
Furthermore, we can relax the assumption of linearity for the main and interaction effects, and obtain similar results to those above. Above, we use linear terms to control for the first-order effects of the lagged accounting variables (dollar debt and total debt). In the working-paper version of this study, we also allow the effects of the predetermined accounting variables (dollar debt and total debt) to be highly flexible by including them as polynomials up to order ten. In effect, this parametrically matches firms based on their t Ϫ 1 characteristics. Estimates of (D* ϫ ⌬e) are qualitatively similar using this technique. On the other hand, a plausible hypothesis is that the response of investment to leverage is nonlinear, so that a given change in debt causes a larger change in investment in highly leveraged firms. To evaluate the effect of nonlinearity on our results, we reestimate our basic investment specification allowing the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction term to vary across indebtedness. The results (found in Bleakley & Cowan, 2005) indicate a small and statistically insignificant interaction effect. Finally, if we allow depreciations and appreciations to have asymmetric effects, we obtain similar coefficient estimates on (D* ϫ ⌬e).
Could our results be driven by the fact that many of the devaluation episodes in our sample were anticipated by firms and the financial market? If uncovered interest parity holds, then the expected component of a depreciation will be factored in to the domestic interest rates in the period running up to the exchange rate realignment. This being the case, firms will only find dollar debt to be more expensive, in an ex post sense, if the realized depreciation exceeds the expected depreciation. 23 We carry out two exercises in this subsection to address this concern.
First, we repeat our estimations of investment for a specific devaluation episode that we believe had a large unexpected component: the tequila crisis in Mexico during 1994 and 1995. Estimates using only the Mexican sample are found in first row of panel A in table 4. In line with 20 Our baseline specification assumes that the error term is uncorrelated with the lagged dependent variable. This assumption is violated if there is an error term in the partial adjustment model for the stock of capital, not in the investment equation as we assume. In this case taking first differences to obtain the investment specification generates a mechanical correlation between I tϪ1 and ⌬ε t (the first difference of the error term). 21 We follow a similar approach to address the possible endogeneity of the main effect of dollar debt. The estimated coefficient on the dollar-debt/real exchange rate interaction remains positive for a reasonable range of parameter choices for the main effects of dollar debt. These results are found in working-paper version of this study (Bleakley & Cowan, 2005, figure 2) . 22 In appendix B of the working paper (Bleakley & Cowan, 2005) , we repeat the sensitivity analysis from this subsection using the various estimators of table 3. Our main results remain unchanged. 23 The specific derivation is as follows. Recall the expression for the law of motion of debt derived in section III. Abstracting from new debt issued in the current period, but now assuming that accrued interest is not paid off (that is, DS t ϭ DN t ϭ 0), we can rewrite equation (4) as follows:
where (r tϪ1 Ϫ ⌬cpi t ) is the real ex post interest rate on domestic-currency debt and (r* tϪ1 ϩ ⌬e t Ϫ ⌬cpi t ) is the real ex post rate on dollardenominated loans, and all lowercase variables correspond to logs. Finally, if uncovered interest parity holds, so that r tϪ1 ϭ E tϪ1 {⌬s t } ϩ r tϪ1 , the autonomous change in debt becomes
where ⌬s t u is the unexpected nominal depreciation (⌬s t u ϭ ⌬s t Ϫ E tϪ1 {⌬s t }). From equation (6), it is evident that a unit of dollar debt will be more expensive ex post than a unit of peso debt only if the realized nominal depreciation exceeds the unexpected nominal depreciation, that is, if E tϪ1 {⌬s t } Ͻ ⌬s t .
results from the full sample, the estimated coefficient on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction term is not negative in either subsample. Indeed, for current capital expenditures and t ϩ 1 inventory investment the estimated coefficient is positive and significant. 24 Next, we use peso and dollar interest rates to construct a measure of unexpected depreciation and estimate its effect on investment of dollar-indebted firms. We augment our default specification with two additional terms: (i) the interaction of total debt with the ex ante peso interest rate, and (ii) the interaction of dollar debt with the unexpected component of the depreciation (D* ϫ ⌬s u ). 25 Including this latter variable allows us to disentangle the effects of expected and unexpected changes in e. The intuition behind this expression is straightforward: controlling for the ex post real interest rate on peso loans, dollar debt will lead to higher total liabilities only if the realized depreciation exceeds the expected depreciation. (A formal derivation is shown in footnote 23.) Panel B of table 4 presents results from estimating this modified equation for fixed capital and inventory investment. As before, the estimated coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e) is positive, and in some specifications significant at conventional confidence levels. Second, the estimated coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬s u ) is insignificantly different from 0.
All in all, both sets of results presented in this section suggest that even when depreciations are unexpected, the competitiveness effect at the very least cancels out the balance sheet effect in our sample.
V. The Competitiveness and Balance Sheet Effects
A. Competitiveness
We argue that our failure to find a negative effect of dollar debt on investment following a depreciation is due to differences across firms in the response of their current and future profits (the competitiveness effect). Firms appear to match the currency composition of their debt and income, and thus the surge in their liabilities may be accompanied by an increase in their profit opportunities and current earnings. As a result, the balance sheet effects of a depreciation on dollar-indebted firms are offset by the larger competitiveness gains for these same firms. In effect, firms have a natural hedge for their exchange rate risk. We provide three pieces of evidence in support of this proposition.
First, firms that could be expected to benefit from a depreciation are more likely to hold debt that is denominated in foreign currency. The pertinent results are reported in the working-paper versions of this study, where we examine the firm-level determinants of liability dollarization. We consider several ex ante measures of the exchange rate sensitivity of profits: a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is in a tradable sector (agriculture, mining, or manufacturing); the average elasticity of each sector's output to the real exchange rate; and a dummy variable if the firm has foreign subsidiaries. Measures of 24 In Bleakley and Cowan (2005) , we conduct this analysis for all five countries represented in our sample. In no instance do we find a significantly negative relationship between investment and (D* ϫ ⌬e). In the Argentinean, Chilean, and Colombian samples, estimates are insignificantly different from 0, though generally positive. For Brazil, the coefficients on (D* ϫ ⌬e) are significant and positive for contemporaneous investment, and positive but not significant for next-period investment. For Mexico, the coefficient estimates are uniformly positive, and significantly different from 0 for two of the four measures of investment. 25 A brief comment on the data is merited here before we move on to discussing the empirical results. For Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico r* j,tϪ1 is the total return on the portfolio of dollar-denominated bonds included in each country's EMBI index. For Colombia and Chile this index is not available for most of the sample so we use alternative measures. In the case of Chile we use the interest rate on 30-to 89-day dollar-denominated loans, published by the Central Bank of Chile. For Colombia, as dollar contracts are prohibited in the domestic financial system, and no series of returns on dollar-denominated bonds placed in international capital markets were available, we use the average cross-country EMBI index. In turn, r tϪ1 is the deposit rate in domestic currency. We use the deposit rate because series of lending rates were not available over the full sample period for most countries, however, changes in deposit rates closely mirror changes in lending rates. A regression of changes in the deposit rate against changes in the lending rate over the subset of our sample where both data were available has an R 2 of 0.85. The exact rates used are detailed in the appendix. Each column/panel reports the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variables are as indicated above each column. Estimates of the effect of the independent variables are listed in each row. Also included in each regression are the various controls used to estimate table 2, column 3. Huber-White standard errors are given in parentheses. A single asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 90% level of confidence; double, 95%; triple, 99%. Firm-level independent variables are once-lagged values. All accounting variables are scaled by the lag of total firm assets. Macroeconomic variables (real exchange rate and CPI) are from the current period. The real exchange rate is defined as nominal exchange rate over domestic CPI. Unexpected depreciations are calculated as the difference between realized depreciations and the expected depreciation implicit in the difference between dollar and peso interest rates. Real peso interest rates are calculated as the nominal peso rate minus ex post inflation. For detailed data sources and variable descriptions, see section II and the data appendix.
exchange rate sensitivity show positive and significant correlations with the fraction of debt issued in foreign currency. In other words, firms whose income we expect to be positively correlated with the exchange rate have a higher fraction of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities.
Second, when contemporaneous sales and costs are taken into account, we find that the estimated coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e) is smaller than what was estimated above. This can be seen in panel A of table 5, in which we augment the baseline regressions with contemporaneous measures of sales and production costs. The first row contains the baseline estimate and the second row contains estimates with the sales and costs controls. Note, however, that the idiosyncratic measures of sales and costs are endogenous, so we cannot be assured of consistent estimates of the effect of income on investment. In the third row of panel A, we address this issue by instrumenting for sales and costs with interacting two digit ISIC sector dummies and lagged export-to-asset ratios with changes in the real exchange rate. Once again we find that when contemporaneous profit measures are taken into account the estimated coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e) is smaller than our baseline estimate.
Third, dollar-indebted firms experience a relative surge in income following a depreciation (both in the year of and in the year after). Panel B of table 5 presents estimates of the differential effect of exchange rate movements across firms with varying degrees of dollar indebtedness. (The specification of these regressions parallel those of table 2, column 3). For example, column 2 indicates that a firm holding one additional dollar of foreign-currency debt received 43 cents in extra operating income in a year following a one-unit logarithmic depreciation in the real exchange rate. 26 We also find positive and significant effects of (D* ϫ ⌬e) on period-t sales (column 4 of panel B), and, in results not reported here, on period-(t ϩ 1) sales and on cash flow (EBITDA) for the current and following year. Unfortunately, we do not have firm-specific deflators, so we are not able to separate whether these differences are due purely to a price response (via differential pass-through of exchange rate changes to the tradable sector, for example) versus a quantity response (because firms with more dollar debt expand their capital stock).
Data from the firms' income statements also allow us to explore whether net currency derivative positions may have played a role in explaining the relative rise in investment in dollar-indebted firms. Our data set does not contain data on derivative positions. Nevertheless, following an unexpected depreciation, firms holding short currency derivative positions (that is, those with contracts to buy dollars) should have reported profits from those positions, which would show up in their nonoperational income. With this in mind, we look at the differential response of nonoperating income for dollar-indebted firms following a depreciation. (To eliminate the confounding effect of higher interest payments, we separate these from our income measure before estimation.) We find that, following a depreciation, nonoperating income for firms holding dollar debt is not significantly different from that of peso-indebted firms, as seen in column 3 of panel B. This suggests that these firms did not have derivative positions in the first place or that counterparts in the derivative contracts did not honor the derivative contracts during the crisis episodes. 27 More importantly, these results imply that in our sample it is the real hedge provided by operating income and not the financial hedge provided by derivative contracts that explains the relatively higher investment response of dollar-indebted firms following a depreciation.
In sum, these results serve as further evidence that firms that choose to hold higher dollar debt experience relative increases in current profits (and therefore internal funds for investment) and in their marginal product of capital following a depreciation. This bolsters our hypothesis that we fail to find a negative coefficient on (D* ϫ ⌬e) because of a large differential competitiveness component.
B. Balance Sheets
Holding dollar debt during a depreciation leads to increased indebtedness (in domestic currency). This discards two possible explanations for the apparent absence of a net-worth effect on investment: either that there was a limited effect on the balance sheet itself or that the data on dollar debt reported in Bloomberg and Economatica are so error ridden so as to not adequately measure subsequent balance sheet problems.
We estimate an equation for the predicted total debt and debt service of firm i in country j in year t. The interaction of (D* ϫ ⌬e) continues to be the term of interest. The theoretical prediction is that the real value of the firm's debt rises if it holds foreign-currency debt and the exchange rate goes up faster than the domestic-price level. The empirical results are found in panel C of table 5. In column 1, the dependent variable is period-t debt, and we see that holding dollar debt during a depreciation causes a near one-for-one rise in the real peso value of debt. For the estimates in column 2, we subtract the firm i's net issuance of new debt in period t (denoted DN i,t T above) from period-t debt before estimation. This simple framework provides a basis for predicting autonomous changes-that is, those caused by the mechanical increase of dollar debt in local currency-in the financial obligations of a firm. Again, we estimate a positive and significant effect on this debt concept. Holding foreign-currency debt during an exchange rate depreciation also increases the interest charges incurred by the firm, as seen in column 3. Finally, in column 4 of panel C, we sum the values for the change in debt and the accrued interest charges to produce a single statistic that describes how the firm's overall financial obligations have changed because of the interaction of dollar debt and the change in the exchange rate. These results are all as we would expect-both in sign and approximate magnitude-from the simple law of motion for debt in section IIIB.
Using the estimated coefficients from previous sections, we sum the effects of a depreciation on debt and on earnings to find the impact of a depreciation on the firm's balance sheet. The question we address is this: was this rise in debt fully offset by higher current earnings so that the balance sheets of firms holding dollar debt did not actually deteriorate? Recall that the contemporary response of earnings to the (D* ϫ ⌬e) term was of order 0.3, while the bottom-line estimate for debt ϩ interest was approximately 1.3. Even if the next year's earnings (with an effect size of 0.4) were fully collateralizable, it would not make up this gap. This indicates that holding dollar debt during a depreciation caused a decline in firm balance sheets, and perhaps even its net worth. This result is consistent with the larger relative drops in stock market capitalization in dollar-indebted Asian firms, found by Allayannis et al. (2001) .
C. Discussion: Debt versus Mismatch
We argue that the results are explained by the fact that firms match the currency composition of their income with that of their debt, and by doing so hedge exchange rate risk. As a result of this matching, firms with high levels of dollar debt are also firms whose current earnings (and marginal product of capital) go up following a depreciation. These positive competitiveness effects offset the negative balance sheet effects of dollar debt. 28 We do indeed find evidence of currency matching. Firms whose income we expect a priori to be correlated with the real exchange rate hold more dollar debt, and firms holding more dollar debt see larger relative increases in their current and future profits following a depreciation.
A series of recent empirical studies have also addressed the question of whether firms holding more dollar liabilities invest relatively less following a depreciation, using a similar empirical specification to the one used in this paper. Bonomo, Martins, and Pinto (2003) look at a sample of publicly listed firms in Brazil over the period 1990 -2002 , and Benavente, Johnson, and Moránde (2003 study the investment response of a similar sample of firms in Chile over the 1994-2001 period. Neither of these obtains a 27 This latter interpretation is in line with results obtained by Allayannis et al. (2001) , who find that in their sample of firms from East Asian economies nontradable firms with net derivative positions fared the worst during the crisis. They argue that this occurred because derivative markets collapsed in these periods. 28 An alternative possible explanation for this result is that changes in the local-currency value of dollar debt have no effect on the investment decisions of firms in our sample. This would suggest either that leverage has no impact on investment, or that market participants believe that temporary changes in leverage due to depreciations have little bearing on the firm's ability to repay its debt in future periods. This hypothesis is difficult to square with (i) the negative coefficient on total debt in most investment specifications and (ii) the fact that firms choose to match in the first place, both of which suggest that balance sheet effects do impact investment decisions. robust, negative, and significant coefficient on the interaction between dollar debt and the exchange rate. Echeverry et al. (2003) address the same question using a much larger sample of firms from Colombia. Drawing on data for nearly 8,000 listed and nonlisted firms over the period 1994-2001, they also fail to find a negative and significant coefficient on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction. 29 Pratap, Lobato, and Somuano (2003) , on the other hand, do find a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between dollar debt and devaluations in publicly listed Mexican firms. We believe, however, that this result may be driven by an omitted variable. In no specification do they control for the interaction between total debt and the real exchange rate. In our sample (and in results shown in Bleakley & Cowan, 2005) , omitting this variable results in a sizable downward bias on the estimated coefficient of the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction. Because the tequila crisis in Mexico was characterized by both a devaluation and a credit crunch, this omission seems problematic. Finally, Luengnaruemitchai (2004) looks at the response of investment to a depreciation in nonfinancial firms in Asia, a region where the balance sheet effect is believed to be prominent. He obtains results that are very similar to the ones reported in this paper: firms holding dollar debt invest at least as much as their counterparts following a depreciation.
A related, but distinct, empirical question is whether firms with larger mismatches between the currency composition of their liabilities and their income invest relatively less in periods following a depreciation. 30 This is equivalent to asking whether-all else constant-raising levels of dollar debt will make depreciations less expansionary. To answer this question requires detailed information on the income and cost structure of firms, as well as the currency denomination of their assets. With this detailed information it is possible to separate the negative balance sheet effects of a depreciation from its positive competitiveness effects on current earnings and the demand for capital. Because of the data requirements, there are few empirical papers that address this question, two of them for Mexico and one for Chile. Aguiar (2005) and Pratap et al. (2003) look at the investment behavior of publicly listed Mexican firms. Aguiar (2005) concentrates on the years around the tequila crisis, while Pratap et al. (2003) analyze firm data from 1989 to 1999. Both control for differential competitiveness effects by including firm-level data on exports interacted with the relevant macroeconomic variables. Both find that following a depreciation, firms with larger currency mismatches invest relatively less. Cowan, Hansen, and Herrera (2005) go one step further and include, in addition to firm-level exports, controls for the currency composition of assets and net derivative positions of Chilean corporations between 1994 and 2001. Interestingly, they confirm the results presented in this paper. Without adding additional competitiveness controls, firms holding dollar debt do not invest relatively less than peso-indebted firms following a depreciation. On the other hand, once the currency composition of assets and incomes is accounted for, they find a significant negative balance sheet effect of dollardenominated debt.
Finally, our "matching" is consistent with existing studies of currency exposure and derivative use by firms in emerging markets. Allayannis et al. (2001) study the currencyhedging practices of nonfinancial firms from eight East Asian countries over the period 1996-1998 and document that in firms in East Asia, foreign cash incomes are a substitute for derivative hedging for dollar-indebted firms. Cowan et al. (2005) obtain similar results for a sample of Chilean nonfinancial firms.
VI. Conclusions
The present study provides evidence on the effect of foreign-currency liabilities on firm-level investment in periods of exchange rate volatility. Our starting point is a concern-advanced recently by several authors-about problems stemming from the currency composition of debt among emerging-market corporations. A consequence of this dollarized debt is that a depreciation may lead to a deterioration of firm balance sheets (as a result of inflated domestic-currency values of debt) that could attenuate or even reverse the usual expansionary effects of the depreciation.
In this vein, we construct a new database of firm-level accounting information (including the currency composition of liabilities) for over 450 firms in five Latin American countries, and use it to estimate the reduced-form effect on investment of holding foreign-currency-denominated debt during an exchange rate realignment. In doing so, we believe that this study addresses a specific channel through which dollarized liabilities interact with exchange rate movements to affect investment by publicly traded firms.
We consistently find that firms holding dollar debt do not invest less than firms holding peso debt in the period following a depreciation. This finding is not what one would expect from a naive model that only considers the detrimental effect of the exchange rate on liabilities. This result is robust to the inclusion of a series of controls and alternative estimation methods.
We argue that this result is due to the degree to which firms match the currency composition of their debt with the elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. In the wake of a depreciation, the inflated peso value of dollar debt causes a deterioration in firm balance sheets that might in 29 There is also a recent study for Peruvian firms, by Carranza, Cayo, and Galdón-Sánchez (2003) . Problems with the empirical specification-in particular the omission of the main effects of the key interaction termsmake the results of this study very difficult to interpret. In those specifications in which the main effects are included, they fail to find a negative and significant coefficient on the (D* ϫ ⌬e) interaction. 30 Note that mismatches and dollar debt will be the same only if there is no matching-that is, if firm debt is uncorrelated with the sensitivity of income to the exchange rate.
turn induce a reduction in output and investment. However, in our sample, for firms holding higher levels of dollar debt this negative balance sheet effect is more than offset by higher current and future earnings caused by the competitiveness effect of the depreciation. Providing support for this hypothesis we find that, after a depreciation, earnings are higher in those firms holding more dollar debt. In addition, in our sample, dollarization of liabilities is higher in firms whose income we expect ex ante to be more positively correlated with the real exchange rate (firms with tradable products, for example).
What do our results imply for the literature on currency mismatches and contractionary depreciations? First, we show that firms holding dollar debt do see their balance sheets deteriorate during depreciations, and, moreover, that total liabilities do appear to influence investment decisions. Second, in our sample firms "match" the currency composition of income and liabilities, so that those firms holding more dollarized debt are also those firms whose income is most highly correlated with the real exchange rate. Third, as a result of matching, the ratio of dollarized debt is a poor measure of firm-level currency mismatches. A more comprehensive measure must incorporate measures of the elasticity of firm profits to the real exchange rate. Sector controls and firm-level indicators of exposure, albeit imperfect, are a first step in this direction. Direct measurement of the idiosyncratic response of income to the exchange rate should also figure prominently in such analysis, as suggested by recent empirical literature. This also suggests that care must be taken when evaluating aggregate (economywide) currency mismatches, as dollar debt may provide a poor measure of exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. Fourth, understanding the microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that drive firms in particular, and private agents in general, to choose the currency composition of their debt is a key theoretical and empirical question. If firm-level incentives were distorted in such a way that no "matching" takes place, then depreciations would indeed be more contractionary for dollar-indebted firms-as dollar debt translates into firm-level mismatches that lead to reductions in investment and output.
